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Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why Judicial Takings May Have
Meant Taking a Little Too Much
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection'
I. INTRODUCTION
Stop the Beach Renourishment started as a seemingly innocent
petition by Destin, Florida and Walton County, Florida requesting the state
repair eroded and damaged beaches along the shorelines of Destin and
Walton County in accordance with Florida's Beach and Shore
Preservation Act. However, private property owners in Destin and Walton
County saw those petitions as a threat to their property rights; specifically,
a way for the government to turn their private beaches into public sands
and their beachfront property into beach-adjacent property. The Florida
Supreme Court held the Act was not in violation of the Takings Clause
because the rights the property owners asserted never actually existed. In
their appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the property owners claimed that
the Florida Supreme Court had effected a judicial taking. The concept ofjudicial takings had been a hotly debated issue even before Stop the Beach
Renourishment, and with the Court's split decision as to the need for the
doctrine, the debate still rages on.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Hurricane Opal wreaked havoc on the Gulf of Mexico in 1995,
causing severe damage to many Florida beaches. As a result of that
damage, many of the beaches were placed on the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection's ("FDEP") critically-eroded beaches list.2 The
shoreline was further damaged by three hurricanes from 1998 through
' 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).2 Melanie King, Florida's Beach Renourishment Act Upheld, 7:4 SANDBAR 6, 6 (2009),
available at http://nsglc.olemiss.edu/SandBar/20PDF/sandbar7.4.pdf
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2004.3 In order to repair damage to the 6.9 miles of the hurricane-
damaged beach within their jurisdiction, the city of Destin and Walton
County filed an "Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization
to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands on July 30, 2003' with the FDEP to
deposit approximately seventy-five feet of dredged sand along the
damaged area that had been hit by the hurricanes in accordance with
Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("Act"). 5  The permit
application recommended the project sand be dredged from an "ebb shoal6
borrow area south of East Pass in ... Okaloosa County"7 using one of two
proposed methods: a cutter head dredge8 or a hopper dredge.9 The sand
would be placed on the damaged beachfront, as per specific design plans
set forth by Destin and Walton County, and the beachfront would be
repaired "usually at a pace of about 300 to 500 feet a day."' 0 Repairs
made at that pace would put the project on track for completion in three
months if the restoration work were performed every day." The seventy-
five feet of sand would become an erosion control line and would be
3 Hurricane Georges (1998), Tropical Storm Isidore (2002), and Hurricane Ivan (2004)
further eroded the Destin and Walton County shoreline after Hurricane Opal's destruction
landed the beaches on the FDEP's list of critically-eroded beaches. Walton County v.
Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 n.4 (Fla. 2008).
4 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106.
5 Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2599-600
(2010) (citing Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106).
6 Ebb shoals "characteristically contain large volumes of beach quality sand, which in the
absence of [tidal currents] would have been deposited on the adjacent beaches
[naturally]." NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION COASTAL
SERVICES CENTER, BEACH NOURISHMENT: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, http://www.csc.noaa.gov/beachnourishment/html/geo/channels.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2011).
7 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1106.
A cutter head dredge "disturbs the sand on the bottom of the borrow area and vacuums
it into a pipeline which delivers it to the project area." Id.
9 A hopper dredge "fills itself [with sand from the borrow area] and is moved to the
rroject site." Id.
lo Id .
1 If the work were performed at a pace of 400 feet per day over a stretch of 6.9 miles
(36,432 feet), the restoration would take approximately ninety-one days to complete.
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placed "seaward of the mean high-water line."' 2 The new boundary
between privately owned beach and publicly owned beach would be the
newly constructed erosion control line, cutting off the private landowners'
rights to future accretionsl3 and relictionsl4 of the beach where the land
abuts the water because that land would then be public property. The right
to receive accretions and relictions (collectively "accretions") are specific
common law property rights held by beachfront property owners in
Florida, separate from those rights to Florida beaches enjoyed by the
public.'"
The petitioner in this case was Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.("Members"), a nonprofit organization made up of six littoral16 property
owners whose land abutted the project area. 17 The Members filed two
petitions for formal administrative hearings, challenging the proposed
project based on the issuance of the permit and raising constitutionality
issues regarding the Act.' 8 The Members' administrative challenges were
broken into two separate proceedings. 19 The administrative hearing
discussed the permit challenge, and the constitutional claims were deferred
for state court determination. After the administrative hearing on the
permit challenge, the administrative judge recommended the permits be21 22issued, and the FDEP approved Destin's and Walton County's permits.
12 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600(2010).
1 3Accretions are the addition of deposits of sand, sediment or other natural material to
waterfront land. Idat 2598.
14 Relictions are areas where the water recedes to uncover previously submerged land,
making it part of the dry beach. Id.
5Id. (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 58-59 (1918)).6 Littoral' means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake." Id. at n. 1.
Walton County v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Fla.2008).




22 Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600(2010).
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The Members then challenged the approval of the restoration
permits in state court based on their constitutional claims.23 The Members
asserted the permits were issued pursuant to an unconstitutional statute24
that places the shoreline boundary at the erosion control line. 25 The
Members claimed that fixing the new boundary at the erosion control line
stripped Members of their rights to future accretions. 26 The District Court
of Appeals of Florida, First District found the approval of the permits
"eliminated two of the Members' littoral rights: (1) the right to receive
accretions to their property; and (2) the right to have the contact of their
property with the water remain intact."27
The First District Court of Appeals held this to be an
unconstitutional taking that unreasonably infringed upon riparian rights,
specifically the property owners' common law property rights to
accretions and rights to contact with the water.28 The infringement
required a showing by the local governments that the local governments
owned or had a "property interest in the upland property adjacent to the
project site" in order to comply with the Act.29 The court set aside the
FDEP's approval of the project permits and remanded in order for the
local governments to show that they either owned or a had a property
interest in the upland property as required by the Florida Administrative
Code .30 Then the court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the
following question: "On its face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just
compensation?" 3'
The Florida Supreme Court answered that question in the negative,
quashing the First District's remand and concluding that the doctrine of
23 Id.
24 King, supra note 2, at 6 (citing FLA. STAT. § 161.191(1)).
25 King, supra note 2, at 6.
26Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.27 Id. (citing Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 57 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
28 King, supra note 2, at 7.2 9 Id. (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (2009)).
30 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d
at 60).
31 Id. (citing Walton County v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105
(Fla. 2008)).
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avulsion32 "permitted the State to reclaim the restored beach on behalf of
the public." 3 The court found that Hurricane Opal and the subsequent
storms were avulsive events. 34 The State was allowed to restore the
storm-damaged beach under the Act because under established Florida
common law, the State is permitted to repair tidelands owned by the State
below the mean high water line removed by hurricanes.35
The Florida Supreme Court also deemed the right to accretions as a
future contingent interest and held that littoral property owners do not
have a right of contact with water "independent of the littoral right of
access, which the Act does not infringe" because all littoral rights are
preserved by the Act except for the rights to accretions.36 The Members
.sought rehearing based upon the assertion that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision itself resulted in an unconstitutional taking of the
Members' littoral rights, and the request for rehearing was denied."
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the littoral property right to
accretions "was ... subordinate to the State's right to fill" and repair the
eroded beaches, and therefore there was no taking.38
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Florida Common Law
Under Florida state property law, "the State owns, in trust for the
public, the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters
and.. . the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water
32 Avulsion is a sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the
water. Bd. of Tr. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., 512 So.
2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
3 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600. (citing Walton County, 998 So. 2d
at 1116-18).
34 King, supra note 2, at 7-8.
35 id.
36Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Walton County, 998 So. 2d at
1112,1119-20).
"Id. at 2600-01.Id. at 2611.
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line."39 Therefore, the high-water line is the boundary between private
littoral40 property and public land.4 1 The State has a duty to protect
publicly held land under the public trust doctrine.42 The littoral property
owners have property rights distinct from those of the public, including
"the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for certain
purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to
receive accretions and relictions4 3 of the littoral property.""
In order to be deemed an accretion, an addition to littoral property
(which would be dry beachfront) must occur so slowly that it is
unnoticeable to the naked eye.4 However, when there is a "'sudden or
perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a
sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream,' the change is
called an avulsion."A6 The difference between accretion and avulsion is
the length of time in which the addition to or retraction of land occurs.
Florida common law delineates that the beachfront property "owner
automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion,"
but has no claim to land that has been added through avulsion; the newly-
dry land "continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usually the
State)."47 No matter the effect of the avulsion (an addition to the
beachfront, or an addition to the seabed), the property boundary between
privately-owned beachfront and state-owned public land continues to be
the mean high-water line, which was in place before the avulsion
39 Id. at 2598. The mean high-water line is "the average reach of high tide over the
?receding 19 years." Id.
o Id.
41 Id. at 2598.
42 King, supra note 2, at 6.
43 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598. The right to accretions and
relictions are pivotal issues in the present case. "Accretions are additions of [sand,
sediment, or other deposits] to waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water
that become dry when the water recedes." Id. For purposes of this case, the Court refers
to accretions and relictions collectively as "accretions." Id.
"Id. (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Al. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 58-59 (1918)).
45 Id. (citing Bd. of Tr. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., 512
So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)).
46 Id. (citing Sand Key, 512 So. 2d at 936).
47 id
383
STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT
occurred.48 Therefore, when previously submerged land becomes dry and
is added to the beachfront through avulsion, the State continues to own
that land as if it were still the seabed, and all future accretions to the newly
exposed land belong to the state, the owner of the land that now abuts the49water.
B. The Florida Beach and Shore Preservation Act
Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act,5 0 passed in 1961,
establishes procedures for projects designed to repair and maintain the
restoration of eroded beaches in Florida by depositing once-submerged
sand dredged seaward from the eroded and damaged beachfronts onto
those damaged beachfronts.5 1 The Act declares restoration and protection
of Florida beaches touching the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and
Straits of Florida a "necessary governmental responsibility ... because
beach erosion is a serious menace to the economy and general welfare of
the people of [Florida] and has advanced to emergency proportions." 52
In order to receive the funds and permits necessary to repair their
beaches, local governments have to apply to the FDEP. 53 The Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund owns Florida's
submerged lands, so if a restoration project undertakes to place a fill on
any areas under water, the Board must specifically authorize those plans in
order for the restoration to be carried out. 54 If dredging the submerged
land to repair the eroded beaches would "unreasonably infringe on riparian
rights," the permits will not be issued unless the local government owns or
has some property interest in the upland property directly next to the
restoration site.55
481 Id. at 2599.
49
50 FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-.45 (2007).
s See id.
52 FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2007).
s3 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 161.101(1),
161.041(1) (2007)).
54 FLA. STAT. §§ 253.12(1), 253.77(1) (2007).
5s Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599-600 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE r.
18-21.004(3)(b)-(c) (2009).
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"[When] a local government applies to the FDEP for [a restoration
permit and] funding for beach restoration, a shoreline survey is conducted
to determine the [mean high-water line] for the [restoration] area." 6 The
mean high water line is the original boundary between public and private
land before the restoration project begins.5 7 "The location of the [erosion
control line] is based on the [mean high water line], the amount of erosion
or avulsion, and protection of ownership of upland property."58
After a beach restoration plan is approved, the Board sets the
erosion control line.5 9 The erosion control line then becomes the boundary
between privately owned littoral property and state property (replacing the
mean high-water line), and once recorded, the erosion control line is
unaffected "by accretion or erosion or by any other natural or artificial
process."60
Nevertheless, the Act "expressly preserves upland owners' littoral
rights, including, but not limited to, rights of ingress, egress, view . . . and
prevents the State from erecting structures on the beach seaward of the
[erosion control line] except as required to prevent erosion."61 The State
does not intend to claim land it does not own prior to the restoration
project or to deprive any private landowner of "legitimate and
constitutional use and enjoyment of his or her property."6 In order to
further protect littoral property holders, if any authorized beach restoration
or repair project cannot be accomplished without taking private property
from private landowners, the project may continue only through eminent
domain proceedings. 63 "The [erosion control line setting the new
56 King, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.58 id.
59 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing FLA. STAT. § 161.161(3)-(5)
2007)).
o FLA. STAT. §§ 161.191(1)-(2) (2007).
61 Walton County v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1108 (Fla. 2008)
citing FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (2007)).2 FLA. STAT. § 161.141 (2007).
63id.
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boundary] is canceled if the project does not begin within a two-year
period, is halted for six months, or the restored beach is not maintained." 64
C. Judicial Takings
The Takings Clause of the Constitution protects any person from
the deprivation of his or her own real property without due process of law
and just compensation for the property taken.65 Under current property
law, the government may take the property of an individual either through66 67a regulatory taking or through the right of eminent domain. Although
the legislative and executive branches may be required to pay
compensation for property taken under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, currently the judiciary is not partially due to the fact that the
Supreme Court has never decided the fate of the doctrine in a majority
opinion.68
Two types of regulatory takings are "per se takings:" permanent
physical invasions of private property by the government and "inverse
condemnations." 6 9 Under a per se taking, if the government permanently
infringes upon a private property owner's right to exclusive possession or
the owner's right to exclude persons from his or her private property, no
matter how small the invasion, the invasion constitutes a taking and the
property owner is entitled to just compensation. In an important case
involving a per se taking, a New York statute required landlords to permit
the installation of television cables on their rental properties. 7' Loretto, a
New York landlord, sued claiming that the cable company's installation of
64King, supra note 2, at 6.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V. This federal Constitutional amendment has been incorporated
to state and local governments since 1897. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 263 (1897).6 6 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that property may be
regulated, but if property is too heavily regulated it will be recognized as a taking).67The government, through eminent domain, has the power to take private property for
public use if the property owner is given just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Steven Geoffrey Gieseler & Nicholas M. Gieseler, The Supreme Court and the Judicial
Takings Doctrine, ENGAGE, Oct. 2009, Vol. 10, Issue 3 at 54.69Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).70 Id.
71 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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cables to the outside of his rental building effected a constitutionally
compensable taking. 72  The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Marshall, found that the permanent presence of the cables, even though a
small intrusion on Loretto's rental property, was a constitutionally
compensable taking.
Under inverse condemnation, the government may create
regulations that are so severe that they render 4private property
economically useless and effectively take the property. The courts treat
this economic devaluation of private property as a per se taking, which
then entitles the property owner to just compensation. A seminal case
regarding inverse condemnation is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.76 In that case, Lucas purchased two beachfront residential lots on
the Isle of Palms in South Carolina for nearly $1 million in 1986." In
1988, South Carolina enacted legislation that effectively barred Lucas
from building any permanent homes on the lots, rendering the lots
"valueless," according to the trial court.7 8 The Court found that when a
regulation goes so far as to declare 'off-limits' all economically
productive or beneficial use of land" compensation must be paid to
recompense the landowner. 79
The Constitution grants special ability to the government through
eminent domain, which is the power of the government to take private
property for "just compensation."80 If the government takes private land
for public use but pays the property owner just compensation, the taking is
constitutional under the right of eminent domain. Some of the most
significant litigation challenging takings under eminent domain turns on
the issue of public use,8 ' which has been defined very broadly to show
2Id. at 424.
7 id. at 441-42.
74 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
" Id
76 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
n Id.
78Id. at 1006-07.
79 Id. at 1030.
80 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
81 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (discussing whether the use of
eminent domain to take private property and give that property to private companies for
387
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deference to legislative decisions regarding takings of property through
eminent domain. 82 The Court will also not deem unconstitutional a
decision to take property through eminent domain for a legitimate public
use solely on the basis that the land will be given to a private entity after it
is taken.83
The most influential question Stop the Beach Renourishment asks
is whether the Takings Clause in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
regulating the actions of the political branches also applies to decisions
made by the judiciary. A judicial taking is when the judiciary makes a
decision about property law that effectively takes property rights from
property holders and gives those rights to the government.84 Although the
Supreme Court had never held judicial takings to exist, the question of
judicial takings had been presented to the Court several times in the past.
Justice Potter Stewart, in his concurrence in Hughes v. Washington,
proposed a test that would declare a judicial decision as a taking when that
decision creates "a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of
precedents."86 "A State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process of law," by simply
retroactively asserting the property rights acquired through a judicial
decision never actually existed in the first place.
Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, joined by Justice O'Connor, introduced the doctrine ofjudicial takings to the judiciary and laid a firm foundation for the
possibility that a future case with stronger facts could support that a
development served a public purpose); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954)
(evaluating whether takings for the creation of a "better balanced, more attractive
community" was a valid public use).82 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
83 "[I]t is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics" that matters in determining
public use. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984).Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602(2010).
8s See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 294-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); see
also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1332, 1334 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)).8 6 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 297.
"Id. at 296-97.
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judicial taking had occurred.8 8 "The petitioners in Stevens alleged that the
Oregon Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of customary use
effected a taking of their private property, without just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 89 Scalia highlighted
the Court's past recognition that some private property rights are so
fundamental they require just payment if taken by state action,90 pointing
to the Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.9'
Scalia wrote that, "[s]ince opening private property to public use
constitutes a taking ... if it cannot fairly be said that an Oregon doctrine
of customary use deprived Cannon Beach property owners of their rights
to exclude others from the dry sand, then the decision now before us has
effected an uncompensated taking," 92 basically reinforcing his view that
the judiciary, just as any other branch of the government, could effect a
taking.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In order to determine if there had been a judicial taking of the
Members' property rights, a four-justice plurality adopted a test examining
whether there was actually an established property right and whether the
Act took that property right from the Members. 93 First, the Court had to
decide whether the state court's decision rested on a "'fair and substantial
basis' [that would lead it to believe] that the Members did not have a
property right to future accretions which the Act would take away." 94
This "fair and substantial basis" review was used because the Supreme
Court was deciding a claim addressing the Takings Clause. When the
Supreme Court is reviewing a federal question, the "nonfederal ground of
decision [must] have 'fair support."' 95 Weighing the "fair and substantial
88 Stevens, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
89 Gieseler, supra note 68, at 54.
90 Stevens, 114 S. Ct. at 1334.
9' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).92 Stevens, 114 S. Ct. at 1334.
9 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2608
(2010) (plurality opinion).
94 id.
9s Id. (citing Broad River Power Co. v. S.C. ex rel Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930)).
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basis" of the state court's decision maintains the authority of the state
court to decide matters of state law-in this case, if there was doubt as to
whether there was an established state law about the property rights in
question, the Court would "not make [its] own assessment but accept the
determination of the state court."96
The Members claimed that the Florida Supreme Court effected a
taking of two of the Members' essential property rights as beachfront97property owners. According to the Members, the right to accretions and
the right to have littoral property touch the water were two rights taken b
the court when it declared that those rights never actually existed.Z
However, the Court stated the Members' claim of judicial taking will not
prevail unless the Members can show that their rights to accretions and to
have littoral property touch the water are superior to the State's rights to
repair the damaged and eroded beaches. 99
The Court explored two distinct areas of Florida law in order to
determine whether there were established property rights given to the
Members and whether the Act took those rights. According to Florida law
the State owns all submerged land that may touch littoral (or privately
owned) property, and as the owner the State has the right to fill and repair
that land so long as it does not encroach upon the rights of the public and
private beachfront landowners.1oo If an avulsion adds dry beach to an area
that had been submerged then that land belongs to the state, "even if it
interrupts the littoral owner's contact with the water."1or The issue then
became whether there was an exception to this law if the State, instead of
other natural occurrences, was the cause of the avulsion.102
The Court decided there was no exception, citing established
Florida law that allowed Florida to fill in its own seabed, leaving the
resulting exposed land property of the State, ultimately treating it as an
96Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 n.9.97Id. at 2610 (majority opinion).
98Id.
99 d. at 2611.
00 Id. (citing Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957) (right to fill
conveyed by State to private party)).
101 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611 (emphasis added).
02id.
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avulsion. 03 To the Court, this left only one outcome: the littoral property
owner's right to accretions was effectively subordinate to Florida's right to
fill its submerged land.104 The court held that the Florida Supreme Court
decision "did not abolish the Members' right to future accretions, but
merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration
project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied."10 5
V. COMMENT
A. Judicial Takings v. Common Law Evolution
Stop the Beach Renourishment has sparked a lot of commentary in
the legal community, and with good reason as the potential effect of
instituting judicial takings would be vast. As property law stands now,
almost all state property rules are set forth from the common law and have
been in place since the United States was founded.1 06 Property law is not
the same as it was in the 1800s because the state judiciary has had the
opportunity to facilitate the evolution of state property law through
changing the common law in court decisions as needed. Public policy and
modem viewpoints have helped to frame these changes in property law,
which is desirable because it has allowed laws to adapt over time.
However, the concept of judicial takings threatens the way common law
property directives have long been created.
When the judiciary transfers property rights from the property
holders to the government, these property holders have no recourse. As of
right now, there is no such thing as a judicial taking in American
jurisprudence. Consequently, there is no avenue for affected property
holders to seek any redress for their injury. If the property holders' land
had been taken through a regulatory taking or through eminent domain,
they would have been given just compensation; however, since the






06 Id. at 2597 (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Founc., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)).
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The judiciary can effect a taking in two different ways. First, a
state legislature may pass a law that seems to take rights from property
holders, which is then challenged in court.10 7 "In deciding a takings
challenge to the statute, a state court might hold that the claimed property
rights did not exist, and reject the takings challenge because there was
nothing to take." 08 The second form of judicial takings can arise from
private civil litigation. "In a case brought by private litigants, a state court
might make a major change to the state's existing property law.',to In
either situation, the outcome is that the court changes the law or affirms a
change in the law that takes property rights from property holders, and
these property holders are left with less property rights and no
compensation for the loss of those rights.
If judicial takings were to be recognized, courts would no longer
be able to change common property law as they saw fit. When thejudiciary made a ruling that would change property law in a way that took
rights from property holders, those holders would have a right of action,
through the doctrine of judicial takings, against the court seeking just
compensation for the property taken by judiciary. In effect, the judiciary
would never be able to change property law in a way that would infringe
upon existing property law rights, even if the rights taken were not in sync
with more modem property law viewpoints, or collided with modernistic
ways property was being exchanged or handled.1o
One argument promoting the doctrine of judicial takings is that thejudiciary should not be able to change property law on a whim, and this
doctrine would keep the judiciary from modifying established property
law. Supporting this proposition is the notion that the primary function of
the judicial system is to interpret and apply the laws made by the
107 Posting of D. Benjamin Barros to PropertyProf Blog, What's At Stake in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2009/07/whats-at-
stake-in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html (July 1, 2009).108 Id. This is the kind of judicial taking presented by Stop the Beach Renourishment.
Id. (citing, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.1984)).
o See generally Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464 (2001) (explaining how courtshave the power to modify rules over time).
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legislative body, who are elected by citizens." 11 The legislature is said to
be more in-tune with public opinion than the judiciary, because the
legislature is elected by constituents who are directly affected by the laws
made by the legislature. Mainly, the legislature is accountable to the
taxpayers, whose funds are spent to acquire property rights of private
property holders, and only the political branches are able to make tradeoffs
between what will most likely be expensive property takings and other
necessary programs fed through public funding. 2 The judicial body is
largely unaffected by public opinion through the operation of election
since most judges are appointed to serve," 3 and therefore, they should not
be able to take property rights from property holders at the expense of
taxpayers to whom the judiciary is not directly responsible through
election.
B. Effects of Judicial Takings on Court Rulings
Courts would undoubtedly be affected by the recognition of the
judicial takings concept in modem jurisprudence in the United States. It
would cause the judiciary to make property law decisions that tiptoe
around the possibility of having to pay property owners money. Do we
really want our judicial system to make their decisions based on the fact
that the state may have to pay property owners large amounts of money?
What would happen if a change was required in common property law to
account for new floodplain zoning and ultimately take property from a
large amount of property owners who own land adjacent to major flooding
areas of a large river? Thousands of property owners could have a cause
of action against the judiciary, even if the judiciary made the decision to
11 See John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is
Different, 35 VT. L. REv. 475, 485-93 (2010).
Id.
"
3 See LARRY C. BERKSON, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, A SPECIAL
REPORT 3 (Rachel Caufield & Malia Reddick eds., 2010),
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Berkson_1196091951709.pdf.
Although most states use a mixture of elections and appointments in choosing judges,
only eight states elect all of their judges in partisan elections, while "[33] states and the
District of Columbia use nominating commissions to help the governor select state
judges, and [23] and the District of Columbia use the commission plan to make initial
appointments to most or all of their courts." Id.
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protect these property owners, preserve the floodplain environment and
benefit the public as a whole. It would not be favorable for courts to be
swayed from making a beneficial decision for our citizens and the
environment merely because the state coffers would suffer substantially
from private litigation.1 4 The judiciary needs to be free of as much
unnecessary influence as possible to make these tough decisions that are
beneficial to its constituents.
Justice Kennedy saw the effect of judicial takings a bit differently,
and stated that there was a possibility that the new restraint of judicial
takings would have the exact opposite effect on the judiciary.'15 Kennedy
saw a possibility for a broad change in property law after the adoption ofjudicial takings because the property owners whose rights would be taken
would be compensated for the loss of those rights.1 6 Essentially, judicial
takings would be a way to free the conscience of the judiciary when it
effected a taking of property rights, because the government would then
recompense those property holders for the loss of their rights.
Justice Scalia offered some help in this area, suggesting that courts
could be liable for compensatory relief, but the remedy for a judicial
taking should not be limited to financial compensation." He asserted that
the high courts would be able to reverse the order that caused the judicial
taking, and remand for further proceedings keeping those petitioning
property holders' rights intact." Although this seems like a just solution,
citizens would again be left with the same result; the common law would
never adapt with the changing times as it is able to do now. Whenever ajudicial taking was effected through changing common law to eliminate
property holders' rights, the higher court would reverse and the common
law would not evolve.
114 Echeverria, supra note I11, at 488.
115 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,2616 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116id.
"' Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
"18 Id.
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C. Risks of Not Recognizing Judicial Takings
As property law stands now, the concept of judicial takings is not
applicable to any decision made by the judiciary. Therefore, at least in
theory, it would be possible for the judiciary to "take" property rights from
property owners who would otherwise be compensated if those same
property rights had been taken by the legislature.
The main fear of an absence of the concept of judicial takings
would be that the legislature would make a law (or laws) that would
eliminate or substantially change established property rights, and then
when the legislation were challenged in court, the legislature would argue
that the property owners never had the right in the first place. If the court
agreed the property owners never had those property rights, the decision
would result in a judicial taking of private property, a concept not
recognized in American jurisprudence. The property owners whose rights
were essentially taken through judicial decision would not be
compensated, and the legislature would have a loophole around the
Takings Clause and its requirement of just compensation.
A situation such as this speaks in favor of instituting judicial
takings, and as Justice Scalia wrote in the plurality opinion of Stop the
Beach Renourishment, "it would be absurd to allow a State to do by
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative
fiat."ll 9 However, this reasoning is not yet persuasive enough to institute
judicial takings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are good arguments on either side of the judicial
takings issue, courts are not yet ready to tackle the intricate doctrine as set
forth by Justice Scalia. The way our courts operate is to interpret a statute
and then fill in the areas the statutes do not address, in a way "[crafting]
the contours" of common law and remolding those contours as time goes
by to reflect new circumstances as they arise.' 20 Relying on the legislature
"' Id. at 2601 (citing Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1332 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
120 W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487,
1491 (2004).
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to create laws that effectively encompass all areas of property law so that
when disputes arise, all intricacies of the law brought out through
litigation will have a clear and concise answer is an unrealistic ambition.
Courts need the unencumbered ability to interpret and apply statutes and
common law in a way that reflects public views and current necessity
without worrying if their decisions will cost the government money.
Stop the Beach Renourishment set the stage for a new age in
property law, but the stage was not strong enough to hold Scalia's call for
a decision in favor of instituting judicial takings. With the Court's split
decision, the question of judicial takings is still yet to be determined, and
there is much debate as to how judicial takings should be handled.
Although it could be beneficial to property owners for the courts to be
regulated in such a way that would restrict their power from being able to
take the rights of property owners abruptly and without compensation, the
potential doctrine of judicial takings has a few kinks that definitely need to
be worked out before we see it instituted in our courts.
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